Navigating Toward the Global Maritime Fulcrum: Does Indonesia Not Need a Sea Captain?

Indonesia shares maritime borders with ten countries. | Picture: Indonesian Navy’s Hydro-Oceanography Agency

On the heels of his first-term presidential victory, Joko Widodo (Jokowi) reiterated the vision he had conveyed during the presidential debate held on June 2014. On that occasion, he envisioned Indonesia as the global maritime fulcrum (GMF). This was arguably the first time [since the Declaration of Djuanda in 1957] that Indonesia outspokenly promoted its global vision on the maritime sector. New to the neighboring countries, the move had triggered varying reactions, from mainly questioning the motif behind and up to the fearfulness that it might destabilize the regional status quo. The Philippines’ ambassador to Japan, for instance, invited Indonesian representatives to solicit more details about it. Although the GMF had been mentioned in Jokowi’s nine-priority agenda (Nawacita), the representatives couldn’t really provide a clear-cut explanation about it.

A few months later, in November 2014 during the East Asia Summit (EAS), Jokowi announced to the world his vision of the GMF. He said,

“Through maritime diplomacy, we  summon all the partners of Indonesia to  join forces in the field of maritime. Together we must eliminate the source of conflicts  at sea, such as fish thievery, violation of sovereignty, territorial dispute, piracy, and sea pollution. The sea must unite us, instead of  separating us.”

Three years forward, all the visions mentioned above were revealed in a white book entitled ‘Kebijakan Kelautan Indonesia’ (the Indonesian Maritine Policy), codified as Presidential Decree No. 16/2017. At the core of it are the seven pillars—previously five—to be accomplished, aiming at bringing Indonesia toward a maritime greatness: marine and human resources development; maritime security, law enforcement, and safety at sea; maritime governance and institutions; maritime economy development; maritime space management and marine protections; maritime cultures; and maritime diplomacy.

The above-mentioned is an introduction shared by Ben Perkasa Drajat, Head of Center for American and European Regional Policy Studies and Development at Indonesia’s Foreign Ministry, during a public lecture held by School of Strategic and Global Studies, American Studies Program at Universitas Indonesia. Along with Ansori Zaini, a representative from the Indonesian Navy, Perkasa was invited to share views and assessments on Jokowi’s GMF programs.

The Foreign Ministry

Perkasa assessed the programs through three dimensions, namely economy, military and defense, and foreign policies. From economic perspectives, the GMF centers on trade and connectivity. The Indonesian government aims to boost inter-island connectivity and connect Indonesia with the rest of the region by building and improving maritime infrastructures, such as sea ports, sea tolls, and connecting facilities. If looked from a regional ASEAN scale, the eastern part of the region, i.e. archipelagic Indonesia, is not effectively connected with the western continental area. This is especially true for the most eastern part of Indonesia where natural resources abound.

At the time of Perkasa’s presentation, 19 new ports have been built across Indonesia, with eight more set to be completed within the same year (2019). The ports development program includes four priorities projects of hubs, namely Western Indonesia Economic and Business Hub for ASEAN (North Sumatra); Energy and Mineral Hub (North Kalimantan); Pacific Rim Economic Hub (North Sulawesi); and High Tech and Creative Economy Hub (Bali). Five ports in the development program are also part of ASEAN Connectivity program. It’s in the government’s agenda to maximize and accelerate the development of the Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity, one of which by promoting public-private partnership (PPP). More initiatives are certainly needed to bolster economic development. Perkasa said that, in addition to connectivity, Indonesia should also seek to promote and implement sustainable management of marine resources and to reduce sea pollution.

On military and defense, he highlighted the challenges and achievements pertaining to modernization of the Navy, Indonesian sea borders, and illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. To strengthen the Navy, the current government continues the previous administration’s approach to fulfill the Minimum Essential Force (MEF) blueprint by 2024, which envisions the Navy to possess 10-12 submarines, 56 frigates and corvettes, and 66 patrol vessels. This vision, however, is unlikely to be achieved within the next five years due to budget constraints and prioritization of procurement that favors the Army. Currently, the Navy possesses five submarines, 13 frigates, 20 [24*] corvettes, and 139* patrol vessels. (Numbers with asterisk are data from Global Fire Power.) Regarding the budget, Jokowi has pledged to increase the defense budget to 1.5% of GDP—previously being 0.7%-0.9%—on his second term provided that the growth rate is 7%.

In this dimension he also noted some progress on delimitation of Indonesia’s sea boundaries, which border ten countries of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, India, Australia, the Philippines, Palau, Papua New Guinea, and East Timor. More differences on border issues are to be set, but it would likely face a winding road due to;

  • different priorities;

  • sensitivity over sovereignty issues;

  • issues on continental shelf, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and archipelagic straight base line;

  • political, economic, and technical factors on negotiation;

  • the absence of standardized norm;

  • different understanding on the concepts of maritime borders;

  • and domestic factors.

Meanwhile, for IUU fishing, as of August 2019 the government has sunk 516 vessels, more than half of which are from Vietnam. (According to the Jokowi administration’s 5-year report, 824 illegal fishermen have been captured with 636 cases completed and 188 processing in the court.) Specifically, he pointed out that Indonesia’s priority for the next five years is to set issues pertaining to ZEE with Vietnam and Malaysia, notably on overlapping zones that still leave room for disputes and are rampant with IUU fishing, as well as to settle border issues with East Timor. He also informed that the foreign ministry has created a new directorate of maritime laws and agreements to deal with these issues.

On the dimension of foreign policies, Indonesia has consistently strengthened its maritime diplomacy by taking initiatives and active involvement in conferences (see Table 1). Moreover, it has also formed bilateral partnerships with ten world maritime countries. Perkasa said that Indonesia ought to synergize its vision of GMF with existing maritime schemes in the region, such as ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI), and EU-Asia Connectivity Strategy. It should strive to find common interests as the basis for mutually beneficial cooperation.

Table 1. Some Achievements on Indonesia’s Maritime Diplomacy

Activities

Deliverables

The Indian-Ocean Rim Association (IORA) Summit in Jakarta (2017)—the first summit held 20 years after the IORA’s establishment.

Provided a solid foundation for the strengthening of maritime cooperation between IORA member countries.

The Our Ocean Conference (OOC) in Bali (2018)

Resulted in 305 concrete and measurable commitments, USD 10.7 billion of financial commitments, and 14 million square km of marine protection areas. In addition, Indonesia also initiated a review mechanism commitment.

The Indonesia-Africa Maritime Dialogue in 2018 in Bali

Generated a common commitment between Indonesia and African countries to strengthen cooperation in sustainable fisheries management and maritime security.

The IORA High Level Panel on Maritime Cooperation for the Inclusive Growth in the Indian Ocean in Bali (2018)

Provided a breakthrough and commitments to accelerate the achievement of the 5-year target of the IORA Action Plan.

The EAS Summit in Kuala Lumpur (2015)

Under Indonesia’s initiative, EAS Leaders’ Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation was adopted

The EAS Summit in Singapore (2018)

Under Indonesia’s initiative, EAS Leaders’ Statement on Combating Marine Plastic Debris was adopted

All in all, he concluded that the government’s efforts toward GMF have been faced with considerable challenges and complexities and that it was not as easy as what they had thought before. Sectoral ego is still one of the main issues that plague the current administration. He suggested the coordinating ministry responsible for maritime domain keep in its track and focus on resolving the problems.

 

The Navy

On assessing the GMF progress, Ansori referred to the Indonesian Maritime Policy, which has outlined five clusters of priority programs: maritime industry and sea connectivity; natural resource industry, maritime services, and sea environmental governance; maritime border and maritime diplomacy; sea defense and security; and maritime culture. He explained the current conditions and strategies of particularly the latter three, where the Navy takes important roles in it (see Table 2-4).

Table 2. Maritime Border and Maritime Diplomacy

Current conditions

Strategies

Not all of Indonesia's maritime boundaries (EEZ and continental shelf) with all neighboring countries have been determined

Accelerating the settlement of Indonesia’s maritime boundaries with neighboring countries.

Countries in the region have not reached a common understanding regarding the implementation of the UNCLOS.

Accelerating the submission for the establishment of continental shelf extension according to the international law.

3,663 islands have not been registered at the United Nations (U.N.) session on Geographic Names Standardization.

Enhancing leadership in partnership in maritime sectoral bilateral, regional, and multilateral levels.

Maritime spatial planning is subject to various interests—the need to synchronize it with other levels of spatial planning.

Accelerating national ocean spatial planning; zoning plan for coastal areas and small islands; zoning of national strategic areas; zoning plan for specific national strategic areas; and zoning plan for inter-regional areas.

Additional comment: Echoing Perkasa, Ansori also suggested that Indonesia synergize the GMF with existing maritime schemes in the region, by putting special attention to great power rivalry and their approaches.

Table 3. Sea Defense and Security

Current Conditions

Strategies

The realization of the Navy budget projected for MEF fulfillment in phase II (2014 to 2019) has not yet been fully achieved; it only reached 61.48% from the target of 75.54%.

Developing strong maritime defense and security through fulfilling the MEF targets.

System and information as well as supervision and enforcement facilities and infrastructures are still limited

Optimizing command, control, communication, computerization, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance system.

Lack of coordination, including overlapping tasks, among stakeholders, especially in regard to monitoring IUU fishing.

Improving maritime institutional governance by reforming laws and regulations to avoid overlapping interests.

Reforming patrol vessels in the sea border area based on compatibility with ships used by other countries.

Creating a single, multitask coast guard by merging all maritime security bodies.

Additional comment: The Navy has also identified security challenges on the sea. On human security, it encompasses piracy, drug smuggling, people smuggling and illegal refugee, slavery, human trafficking, and arm smuggling. On environmental security, it encompasses debris, illegal transshipment, poaching of endangered sea animals, IUU fishing, dumping of hazardous chemical and radioactive substances, and nuclear-weapon testing.

Table 4. Maritime Culture

Current Conditions

Strategies

A decline in preference over the fishing profession due to limited skills and technological adaptation; low access to productive capital; adverse trading chains; low mastery of business management; and lack of social protection.

Building facilities and infrastructures to develop fishing business, aquaculture, and salt production.

The so-called ‘Triple Helix,’ which is a set of interactions between academia, industry, and governments, has not been reached.

Improving easy access to knowledge, information, and technology, as well as access to land and credit to develop business.

Low education on maritime human resources.

Increasing maritime research collaboration and developing maritime center of excellence.

Increased services in the maritime sector are balanced with employment availability.

Developing maritime-oriented educational curriculum.

Increasing the quality and quantity of tertiary institutions in the field of maritime affairs as well as shipping and fisheries schools; expanding employment and business opportunities for the community, especially in fisheries, energy, and marine tourism sector.

Additional comment: Only 2.3 million or more or less 1% of Indonesian people work in the maritime sector. That’s ironic considering Indonesia holds such a huge potential of maritime resources. As of today, just a quarter (24.5%) or USD 17.6 million/year of the fishery resources are utilized. The same goes for offshore oil and gas resources; Indonesia has the potential to produce a total of 106.2 million oil barrels on which 89.5 million of it have not been exploited.

Furthermore, to support the GMF vision, the Navy has also formulated five types of programs aligned with the GMF’s five pillars—although now it’s updated to seven:

  • On developing maritime culture, the Navy develops and implements maritime curriculum and training, organizes sailing events and other competitions related to maritime, etc.

  • On managing marine resources, the Navy provides sea protection, assists coastal communities, partners with ministry of agriculture to produce seaweeds, etc.

  • On developing infrastructure and maritime connectivity, the Navy provides sea protection, empowers defense industry, and promotes maritime tourism—such as holding Great Sail Indonesia event, etc.

  • On advancing maritime diplomacy, the Navy deploys navy diplomats, holds diplomatic events, attends regional and international fora, etc.

  • On boosting maritime defense, the Navy introduces a concept of maritime defense, showcases maritime power, etc.

At the end of the lecture, he mentioned how Soeharto’s New Order era had disproportionately favored the Army, by allocating more budget and assigning Army representatives in strategic positions. The decade-long focus on ‘land’ has deprived Indonesians of the ability to understand and utilize the ocean. To create a maritime paradigm among the society would thus take a long time, he said, suggesting the coordinating maritime post be filled with the Navy representative.